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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
September 30, 1985, Conference 
Summer List 23, Sheet 3 
No . 85-214-CSY 
reLAWARE 
v . 
FENSTERER (convicted of mur-
der) 
Cert to Sup. Ct. Del. 
(McNeilly, Horsey, Christie) 
State/Criminal Timely .../ 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that Sup. Ct. Del. erred in 
reversing resp•s conviction on the ground that admission of tes-
timony of a prosecution witness violated resp's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
~-csv 
2. FAC'l'S AND DEC 1 S 1 ON &EL0\-7: 
murdering his girlfriend, Stephanie Swift. Evidence of guilt wan 
entirely circumstantial. The pros~'>culion•s theory ·~as that rgc r, 
had strangled Swift with a cat leash. To substantiate this th~-
or:y, the prosecution sought to prove , among other things , that 
two hairs found on the leash were similar to Swift's hair arrl 
~at one of these two hairs had been forcibly remov~d. To esta~­
lish that the hair had been forcibly removed, the State offered 
~stimony of an FBI agent , who was an expert in hair analysis. 
'!'he agent testified that, in his opinion, one of the 
hairs had been forcibly removed. He explained that there are 
three methods by which to determine if hair has been forcibly 
removed: (1) the presence of the follicular tag on the hair, f2 1 
the presence of an elongated root, and (3) the presence of a 
sheath of skin around the root. But the agent was unable to 
state which method he had relied on in forming his opinion . ~he 
agent could not remember which of the three methods he had used 
to test the hair, and his notes reflected only his concli.Jsion 
that the hair had been forcibly removed. On cross-examination, 
the agent persisted in his inability to remember which method he 
had relied on. 
The defense presented its own expert in hair analysis. 
~he defense expert testified that, prior to trial, the FBI agent 
had told him that the agent had based his conclusion on the '•fol-
licular tag• method. 'I·he defense expert then stated that scien-
tific authority contradicted the agent•s theory that the follicu-
lar tag method indicated that hair had been forcibly removed. 
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sup. Ct. Del. reversed petr 's conviction for second-
degree murder on Confrontation Clause grounds. The primary in-
terest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-
examination~ See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 415 (1965). The 
agent •s conclusion that a hair on the leash had been forcibly 
removed from the victim's head was "highly material ," and an FBl 
agent is likely to be a highly credible witness in the eyes of 
the jury. "Effective cross-examination and discrediting" of the 
agent ' s testimony required that the agent acknowledge the basis 
of his opinion. ln the absence of such acknowledgment, defense 
efforts to cross - examine the agent were "an exercise in futili-
ty." The defense expert's testimony that the agent had informed 
1 him of the method on which the agent relied was not equivalent to 
the agent's own acknowledgment. Since resp had been denied his 
right ef feet i ve ly to cross-examine a key prosecution witness, 
Sup. Ct. Del. had no choice but to reverse the conviction . 
3. CON~ENTIONS: Petr contends that Sup. Ct. Del. erred 
in concluding that the Confrontation Clause requires an appellate 
inquiry in to effectiveness of cross - examination. Se1i!- Ohio v. 
R:>berts, 448 u.s. 56, 73 n.l2 (1980) {in all but "extraordinary" 
cases, there is no need for inquiry into effectiveness of cross-
examination at prior hearing at which unavailable witness gave 
statement sought to be admitted at trial). Confrontation Clause 
values are fully safeguarded where, as here, the witness takes 
the stand Y- e e ca 1 i for n i a v • Green , 3 9 9 U • S . 14 9 , 15 7 < 19 7 0 > 
("literal right" to confront witness at trial "forms the core of 
the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause"), and is sub-
u.s. 
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to unlimited cross-examination, .see Davis v. Alaska, 415 
(essential purpose of confrontation is to 308, 315 (1974) 
secure cross-examination) . By cross- examining the agent with 
respect to his faulty recollection and by showing that the agent 
formerly had disclosed the method on which he relied, defense 
counsel provided the jury with ample means to judge the agent's 
credibility and to weigh the value of his expert opinion. ln 
~lifornia v. Green, the Supreme Court did leave open the possi-
bility that a witness ' s lapse of memory might raise Confrontation 
Clause problems. But the concerns reflected in Green are not 
implicated by this record for Green involved admission at trial 
of a witness's preliminary hearing statement when the witness 
claimed that he could not remember the events described in that 
statement . 
Petr further contends that Sup. Ct. Del.'s holding con-
flicts with a decision of CA7. In United States v . Bastanipour, 
697 F.2d 170 (CA7 1982), Qert. denied, 460 u.s . 1091 (1983), CA7 
..6 
held that a defendant • s confrontation right was not violated 
under circumstances similar to those in this case. In 
.&stanipour, the prosecution's expert gave an opinion, but he 
stated on cross-examination that he could not recall the "litera-
ture spectra" on which he had based his analysis , that he had 
lost or destroyed the "standard spectra" he had used, and that he 
did not know anything about the computer program he had used in 
his analysis. CA7 rejected the defendant's argument that these 
circumstances prevented him from conducting a meaningful cross-
examination. The question was one of the weight, not the admis-
r>vic10nC"e>. Dcf:ens0 C"Ollnse1 war-; ahle to and cJirl 
conduct: pf.'f:f'ctivr> cr:oss-cxaminatjon by calling attention to the 
· e and failure to retajn materials. cxpert:'n Jgnoranc 
Pctr also points to lower court decisions holding that, 
in the C"ontext of: admission of prior statements , a witness's 
lapse of memory do~n not create Confrontation Clause problems. 
~r example, in Unjted States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (CA4 1982), 
c:el't . __ ~~-nied, 461 u.s. 945 (1983), a witness testified before a 
~ grand jury, stating that he and defendants had robbed a bank. At 
trial, the witness stated that he thought he had robbed the bank, 
~at he could not remember who his accomplices were, and that his 
grand jury testimony was false . CA4 held that admission of the 
grand jury testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause 
because the witness took the stand at trial and was subject to 
cross-examination. Defendants were not denied the opportunity 
for effective cross-examination for the witness admitted that he 
had an expensive heroin habit and that agents had suggested that 
~ namp the defendant~ as his accomplices . S~e~e~~~~~~~~ 
~ _?tate~ ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler , 548 F. 2d 460, 462-63 (CA3 1977); 
State v. Gustafson, 266 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Minn. 1978). CAS has 
apparently adopted a "case-by-case" approach, under which it con-
siders the jury's ability to weigh the credibility of the extra-
judicial statement , the importance of the statement to the gov-
ernment ' s case , and the eff.ectiveness of limiting instructions. 
See Uni ter'J States v. ~Qg~, 549 F. 2d 490 (CAS 1976), cert . de-
n i ( .. (j I 4 :n lJ • $ • 9 }.8 ( 1 9 7 7) • 
Petr requests the Court to consolidate this [.Jetiti,.~ra 
with, or hold the petition pend ing decision 
0. 
in, Q!:"..lfwau! ,, . ~ 
Arsdall, No. 84-1279 (cert. granted) . Van Arsdall raises the 
question whether a Confrontation Clause violation r~quires auto-
matic reversal of conviction without consid~ration of whether or 
oot the error was harmless. Petr contends that Sup. Ct. Ot:::. 
J applied its "automatic reversal" rule and gave no consideration 
w the harmlessness of the error in this case. 
Resp contends that his Confrontation right effectively 
to cross-examine the agent was denied. Since the agent would not 
acknowledge the basis of his opinion, the defense could not force 
~e agent to admit that all scientific authority contradicted his 
conclusion. There is a material difference between showing that 
the agent had a faulty memory and that he is a "bad expert." 
Moreover, Sup. Ct. Del. did not apply the automatic reve::sa~ 
rule, but rather found that the Confrontation Clause violation 
prejudiced petr. Sup. Ct. Del. found that the agent's concl~sion 
was "highly material" and that his lapse of memory prevented 
cross-examination with respect to the conclusion. 
Resp further contends that state grounds support Sup. 
Ct. Del.'s decision to reverse the conviction. Under Del. R.. 
Evid. 705, expert opinion testimony is not admissible unless the 
expert discloses the basis for his opinion. Resp acknowledges 
that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine is not 
directly implicated in this case since Sup. ct. Del. did not 
reach the evidentiary argument. Resp made the argument to Sup. 
page 7. 
(),,I and he believes that the court would reach the same Ct • ~ · • ' 
r~sult on this oround as it did under the Confrontation Clause. 
4. DlSCUSSlON: 1 believe that this petition is worth a 
g1·ant. Sup. Ct . Del. has identified a Confrontation Clause vio-
lation on facts that 1 believe are substantially different from 
the circumstances previously identified by the Court as raising 
confrontation concerns. Many of the Court's Confrontation Clause 
decisions im·ol ve admission of a witness's prior statements under 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The concerns of those cases, 
ti1at the defendant is being denied the right physically to con-
front the witness at trial or the right to cross-examine the wit-
ness at the time the statement was made, are not present in this 
case. 
1 suppose that resp would argue that the agent's lapse 
of memory rendered h irn "unavailable" for cross-examination wit..~ 
respect to the basis of his opinion. See California v . Green, 
399 u.s. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Lomax, 608 
P.2d 959, 965-67 (Kan . 1980}. Green does suggest that, where a 
witness's lapse of memory "so affect[s]" the defendant's abili~· 
to cross-examine the witness, the Confrontation Clause may be 
~alated. But the danger raised on the facts of Green related to 
the defendant's inability to provide the jury with means to eval-
uate the credibility and reliability of the witness concerning 
key events described by the witness in a prior statement that 
incriminates the defendant and that is admitted at trial. 1 do 
not believe that a similar danger is presented here . 
4-CSY page 8. 
Though petr goes too far in arguing that the Court has 
not shown any concern for the effectiveness of cross · t' 
-exam1.na 1on, 
1 doubt that, under the circumstances of this case, resp was de-
nied his right of cross- examination. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 
u.s. 415 (1965} , the prosecutor was permitted to impeach a wit-
ness invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege by reading the wit-
ness's prior unsworn confession. The case presented a Confronta-
tion Clause violation because the defendant was unable to conduct 
any cross-examination of the witness concerning the confession 
because the witness refused to answer any questions. In Davis 
v. Alaska, 415 u.s. 308 (1974), defendant was deprived of his 
oonfrontation right when the TC ruled that he could not cross-
examine the key prosecution witness on a prior conviction that 
would reveal the witness's bias. By foreclosing to defendant 
this critical area of inquiry, the state court had deprived the 
defendant of his "right of effective cross- examination." ld. at 
318. In this case, the agent gave his opinion before the jury 
~at was to determine guilt or innocence. The agent was subject 
to cross-examination that was not subject to any 1 imitation by 
~e TC. His inability to acknowledge the basis of his opinion 
did mean that resp could not focus his attack on one particular 
method of identifying hair that has been forcibly removed. But, 
in my view, the agent's faulty memory itself provided resp with 
an effective means of showing the jury that the agent was an un-
reliable expert. 
Resp's claim that Sup. Ct. Del's opinion rests on ade-
quate and independent state grounds lacks merit. Sup. Ct. Del. 
) 
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explicitly rested decision on Confrontation Clause grounds . The 
court acknowledged that resp presented additional evidentiary 
arguments, but it expressly stated, "We do not address these con-
tentions due to our reversal on Confrontation Clause grounds." 
under these circumstances, the Supreme Court will not view the 
state court's decision as resting on adequate and independent 
&ate grounds. See Michigan v . Long, 463 u. s . 1032 (1983) . 
I am not sure that the Court would wish to consolidate 
~is case with Van Arsdall, No. 84-1279 (cert. granted). In Van 
ksdall, the state concedes for purposes of review the existence 
of a Davis v . Alaska violation . Thus, the only question present-
ed in the case is whether automatic reversal is required without 
analyzing for harmless error. In my view, the main question pre-
sented in this case is whether the state court properly found the 
existence of a Confrontation Clause violation. If the Court de-
cides not to grant cert. in this case, however, a hold for Van 
ksdall seems appropriate . Sup . Ct. Del. did state that resp 
had been denied his right of cross - examination with respect to a 
material issue . But it did not expressly consider whether ' in 
view of all the other evidence in the case, the error was harm-
less. 
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